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The New York State Reform Strategy:
Incentive Effects of  Raising the Bar above Minimum Competency
by John H. Bishop and Ferran Mane
Cornell University
Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona
Educational reformers and most of the American public believe that teachers ask too
little of their pupils.  African-American and Hispanic parents, in particular, criticize the low
expectations and goals that teachers and school administrators often set for their children.
These low expectations, they believe, result in watered down curricula and a tolerance of
mediocre teaching and inappropriate student behavior.  The result is that the prophecy of low
achievement becomes self-fulfilling.
The problem of low expectations is not limited to minority students or lower income
communities. It’s endemic. High school subjects are taught at vastly different levels.  Research has
shown that learning gains are substantially larger when students take more demanding courses.
Controlling for teacher qualifications and student ability and socio-economic status does not
significantly reduce the positive effects of course rigor on test score gains (Kulik 1984, Monk 1994,
Bishop 1996).   Why then do students not flock to more demanding courses?  First, these courses
are considerably more work and grades tend to be lower.  Secondly, the rigor of these courses is
not well signaled to parents, neighbors, employers and colleges, so the rewards for the extra work
are small for most students.  Admissions staff of selective colleges learn how to read the transcripts
of high schools they recruit from and they evaluate grades in the light of course demands.
However, most colleges have, historically, not factored the rigor of high school courses into their
admissions decisions.i   Employers hardly ever consider the rigor of high school courses when they
make hiring decisions.  Consequently, the bulk of students who do not aspire to attend a selective
college quite rationally avoid rigorous courses and demanding teachers.
Many parents support their children’s preference for taking easier courses.  Even in wealthy
communities, they often pressure guidance counselors to let their child switch to easier courses
where it is easier to get good grades:
A lot of... parents were in a ‘feel good’ mode. “If my kids are not happy, I’m
not happy.” …Probably…25 percent …were going for top colleges.  They
were pushing their kids hard.  The rest---75 percent (I’m guessing at the
numbers)---said “No, that’s too hard, they don’t have to do that.”…If they [
the students] felt it was too tough, they would back off.  I had to hold
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people in classes, hold the parents back.  [I would say] “Let the kid get C’s.
It’s OK. Then they’ll get C+’s and then B’s.”  [But they would demand,] “No!
I want my kid out of that class!”
Teachers often supported students switching to easier classes.
....frankly we couldn’t get the staff to agree [to holding struggling or lazy
students in more demanding classes] either. They would say, ‘He’s not
learning....Get him out....Let the kid drop into an easier class.”( guidance
counselor’s description of the situation prior to the high school switching to All-
Regents, 1997)
This guidance counselor’s wish to push students into more challenging courses is unusual.
Most counselors see themselves as helping students set “realistic” goals and avoiding courses
where the student will be “in over his head.”   At most schools parents who want their child in the
more demanding course are accommodated, but, behind their back, they are referred to as
"pushy."   Most parents, however, are not aware that assignments to classes will be changed if they
demand it.  Minority parents and parents with limited education are less likely to question these
class assignments and this contributes to their children being disproportionately assigned to classes
that set minimal learning goals.
I. Public Opinion about Standards and Minimum Competency Exams
State level political and educational leaders have been concerned about this problem
for decades.  The traditional policy instruments—budgetary support for schools and school
construction, teacher certification rules, etc.—did not address learning standards, so other
instruments were sought.  Many states increased the number of courses required to graduate.
This, however, did not assure that the courses taken are challenging or that students work
hard in these courses.  Another approach has been to require that schools give students
achievement exams and publish the results.  The hope is that publicly identifying low
performing schools will spur the local superintendent and school board into taking remedial
action.  Some states and cities have developed interventions such as reconstitution for poorly
performing schools.  Other jurisdictions have rewarded schools for year to year gains in
achievement exam scores.
Probably the most common response to the problem of low expectations and low
achievement has been to define standards for learning, exam students against these
standards and require that students pass exams assessing the achievement of these
standards before graduating.  Table 1 presents data from 1980 and 1992 on the proportion of
high school students who are required to pass minimum competency examinations (MCEs) to
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graduate from high school.  School principals were the source of the information on graduation
requirements.  In most cases MCEs have been developed and mandated by the state boards
of education.  In other cases local school districts establish the requirement.  In 1980 49
percent of the nations high school students faced a MCE requirement.  In 1992 56 percent
faced MCE requirements.   The increase appears to have been concentrated in states and
school districts with large minority populations.  In 1992 seventy-nine percent of the Hispanic
and African-American students faced such requirements.
Table 1: High Schools Requiring Passage of a Minimum Competency Exam to Graduate:
Proportion of Seniors Who Attend
Socio-Economic Status Low Medium High
1980 .560 .503 .487
1992 .647 .557 .442
Reading & Math Scores Low Medium High
1980 .547 .515 .466
1992 .643 .565 .457
Ethnicity White/Asian Black Hispanic Total
1980 .466 .567 .568 .49
1992 .479 .790 .790 .56
Source:  Tabulations of HSB and NELS-88 principal survey responses weighted by the number of
seniors sampled at the high school.  The HSB survey over sampled schools with large minority
populations.  The total figures in column 5 are averages of the ethnicity specific rates in columns 1-
3 using national proportions of high school students from each ethnic group as weights.
Surveys of public opinion about MCEs suggest that the policy is  supported not only by
voters and teachers but apparently by students as well (see Table 2).  In 1997, representative
samples of adults, teachers and students were asked the following question: “Supp se your
school required students to learn more and exams them before they were allowed to
graduate. Do you think that most kids would pay more attention to their school work and
study harder or not? ”   YES answers were given by 71 percent of adults,  75 percent of teachers,
74 percent of white high school students, 82 percent of Hispanic students and 80 percent of
African-American students (Johnson and Farkas 1997).  Similar proportions agreed that in addition,
“most kids would actually learn more.”  This survey also asked  “Do you think:
Schools should expect inner-city kids to learn as much and achieve at the
same standards as kids from middle-class backgrounds?
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or
 Should schools make things easier for inner-city kids because they come
from poor backgrounds?
As one can see in Table 2, the first option was selected by 60 percent of the adults, 73 percent
of the teachers, 86 percent of the white students, 78 percent of the Hispanic students and 84
percent of the African-American students.
The students’ responses to these questions suggest that students do not perceive
themselves as working very hard and that, if more was required of them, they would try harder.
Also noteworthy is the opposition of minority students to making “things easier for inner city
kids because they come from poor backgrounds.”  Many survey respondents, however,
thought that tougher graduation exams would also have some negative consequences.   A
little more than half of students agreed with the statement that “more kids will drop out” and
“more kids will dislike education and resist learning.”   Are they correct?  What effects have
minimum competency exams had on high school drop out rates, college entrance rates and
college drop out rates?  What effects have they had on the quality of the jobs obtained by high
school graduates?  Are these effects different for students from less advantaged or minority
backgrounds?  New York State was one of the first states to make graduation contingent on
passing a series of minimum competency exams.  How are New York State’s policies evolving
and what impacts are they likely to have?  These are the questions to be addressed in this
paper.
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Table 2: Student Opinion about the Effects of Minimum Competency Exams
“Suppose your school required students to learn more
and tested them before they were allowed to graduate.”
     Percent Responding Yes
African-
American
HighSch
Students
Hispanic
High
School
Students
White
High
School
Students Adults Teachers
Do you think that most kids would pay
more attention to their school work and
study harder or not?
80% 82% 74% 71% 75%
Do you think that most kids would
actually learn more, or not?
79% 75% 72% 72% 75%
Do you think that more kids will drop
out, or not?
55% 53% 54% 45% 49%
Do you think that more kids will dislike
education and resist learning, or not? 55% 56% 51% 38% 27%
Do you think:
Schools should expect inner-city kids to
learn as much and achieve at the same
standards as kids from middle-class
backgrounds?
OR
84% 78% 86% 60% 73%
Should schools make things easier for
inner-city kids because they come from
poor backgrounds?
13% 19% 10% 32% 22%
Source: Surveys of representative samples of students, adults and teachers. Table 8 of Jean
Johnson and Steve Farkas, Getting By: What American Teenagers Think about their Schools,
New York: Public Agenda, 1997, 1-54.
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II.  The Effects of Raising the Bar Above Minimum Competency on Dropout Rates
A number of studies have examined the effect of minimum competency exams (MCE)
graduation requirements on enrollment rates and high school graduation rates.  Dean Lillard
(1997) and  Lillard and DeCicca (1997a, 1997b) found that graduation rates declined by increasing
the number of courses necessary to graduate but not by MCE’s.   Their analyses of longitudinal
data from NELS88 found that different specifications produced different estimates of their impact
on drop out rates.  Models that controlled for state fixed effects and examined the effect of
introducing a state MCE tended to find no effect.
In order to study this issue in greater depth, state level data on enrollment rates and
high school graduation rates were analyzed.  The dependent variables were the enrollment
rate of 17 year olds (taken from the 1990 Census and from NCES, Education in States and
Nations, 1991) and the high school graduation rate (the ratio of the number of high school
diplomas and GEDs awarded in the state to the number of 17 year olds).ii   Data on each
state’s high school graduation requirements—minimum competency exams and the number of
Carnegie units required to graduate--were taken from the 1992 and 1996 issues of the Digest
of Educational Statistics.  The information from the two different sources is not completely
consistent so separate regressions were run using indicators of state graduation requirements
taken from each source.  The control variables characterizing the demographic background of
the state’s high school age youth were as follows:
· a parents’ education index equal to the average of the percent of parents with a
high school diploma and the percent of parents with a university degree,
· incidence of poverty for children under 18.
· percent population foreign born.
· percent of public school students African American.
· percent of public school students Hispanic.
· A dummy variable for New York State (testing whether the voluntary Regents
Exams have any impacts on drop out rates.)
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Table 3:  Determinants of School Enrollment and High School Graduation Rates
Percent of 17 year
olds Enrolled in High
School
--1990 Census
Percent of 17 year
olds Enrolled in High
School
--1991 States & Nations
Secondary School
Graduates per 100
Persons 17 years
old
State Minimum
Competency Test5
- .76
(1.10)
1.05
(1.41)
- .17
(  .37)
 .87*
(1.81)
-1.19
(  .64)
- .08
(  .04)
New York State 1.78
(  .98)
1.80
(  .98)
.33
(  .27)
.05
(  .04)
-.83
(  .17)
-.88
(  .18)
Number of Carnegie
Units Required to
Graduate
-.27**
(2.59)
-.34***
(3.22)
-.15**
(2.26)
-.19***
(2.88)
-.20
(  .73)
-.24
(  .82)
No Carnegie Unit
Grad Requirement
-4.79**
(2.84)
-5.96***
(2.80)
-3.05**
(2.22)
-3.73***
(2.73)
-1.46
(  .26)
-1.97
(  .34)
Parents Education
Index1
  .29**
(3.22)
  .34***
(3.19)
.11
(1.55)
.13*
(1.97)
.81***
(2.76)
.87***
(3.04)
Percent in Poverty
(People 18 years or
less) 2
.043
(  .55)
.063
(  .84)
-.02
(  .40)
-.014
(  .30)
-.04
(  .19)
-.01
(  .07)
Percent Foreign
Born3
-.15*
(1.74)
-.22**
(2.69)
-.19***
(3.27)
-.22***
(4.18)
-.11
(  .44)
-.17
(  .77)
% of Public School
Students Black4.
-.037**
(1.40)
-.071**
(2.45)
-.040**
(2.33)
-.061***
(3.33)
-.215***
(3.04)
-.231***
(2.93)
%  of Public School
Students Hispanic4
-.036
(  .97)
-.046
(1.26)
-.006
(  .26)
-.014
(  .59)
-.236**
(2.40)
-.239**
(2.39)
Adj R Squared .4922 .5010 .5405 .5708 .6496 .6460
RMSE 1.657 1.642 1.087 1.050 4.463 4.486
Mean of Dependent
Variable
88.9 88.9 84.2 84.2 75.8 75.8
* Statistically significant at 10% level   **  Statistically significant at 5% level   *** Statistically
significant at 1 % level
1 Average of the percent of parents obtaining a secondary high school diploma and the percent of parents obtaining a university
degree. Education in States and Nations. National Center for Education Statistics. 1991.  Pg. 139.
2  Education in States and Nations. National Center for Education Statistics.  U.S. Department of Education.  1991.  Pgs. 49,
129, 119.
3 1990 Census of Population.  Social and Economic Characteristics U.S.  Pgs. 174-79.
4  Digest of Education Statistics. National Center for Education Statistics.1993.  pgs . 61 & 76.
5 Columns 1,  3 and 5 regressions use a competency exam variable based on a 1985 study by the Education Commission of the
States in the 1992 Digest of Educational Statistics, pg. 148. Columns 2, 4 and 6 regressions use a competency exam variable
based on the 1996 Digest of Educational Statistics, pg 149.
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The results of the regression analysis are presented in Table 3.  Four of the six
coefficients on the State Minimum Competency Exam variable are negative, but none come
even close to statistical significance at the 10 percent level.  The only significant coefficient on
the MCE variable is positive. One has to conclude that there is no evidence in these data that
MCE’s of the type that existed at the beginning of the 1990s lower graduation rates.  New York
State’s voluntary Regents exams also appear to have no significant effects on dropout rates or
graduation rates.  However, the number of Carnegie units required to graduate does have
significant negative effects on enrollment rates. For graduation rates, the Carnegie unit
requirement variable is negative and similar in magnitude to the enrollment rate regressions,
but far from statistical significance.
Many states have increased their graduation requirements by 3 or 4 Carnegie units
over the last few decades. The regressions imply that these increases in Carnegie unit
graduation requirements should have, ceteris paribus, decreased enrollment rates of 17 year
olds by about one percentage point.  Data on trends in dropout rates are presented in Table 4.
Despite the policy shifts making high school graduation more difficult, high school completion
rates of 19/20 year old African-Americans rose from 67.2 percent in 1972-73 to 70.6 percent in
1981-82 and then to 75.2 percent in 1990-92.  During the 1970s high school completion rates
of white 19-20 year olds fell slightly from 85.3 percent in 1972-73 to 84.7 percent in 1981-82.
They then rose during the 1980s to 87.7 percent in 1990-92.  Hispanic completion rates also
increased.  Event and status drop out rates also declined during the period when MCEs were
being introduced and graduation requirements were being increased.  Clearly, if tougher
graduation standards do tend to increase dropout rates, their effects were counterbalanced
and indeed overwhelmed by other forces that reduced dropout rates, such as growing incomes
and the rising payoff to high school completion and college attendance.
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Table 4: Trends in Dropout Rates by Ethnicity
Event Dropout
Rate
Grades 10-12
Status Dropout
Rate-16-24 yr
olds
Completed High
School -19/20 yr
olds
White Black Hispanic White Black Hispanic White Black Hispanic
1972-73  Avg 5.4 9.8 10.6 11.9 21.8 33.8 85.3 67.2 55.0
1981-82  Avg 4.8 8.7 9.9 11.4 18.5 32.4 84.7 70.6 57.8
1990-92  Avg 3.4 5.3 7.9 8.5 14.0 32.3 87.7 75.2 58.1
1995-96 4.3 6.6 10.7 7.95 12.55 29.7
Source: National Center for Education Statistics. Dropout Rates in the United States 1992,
Tables A32, A38 & A50 and Dropout Rates 1996, Table A23.  The event dropout rate is the
percent of 10-12th grade students in October of one year who are not enrolled in high school or
graduated the following October.  The status dropout rate is the percent of 16-24 year olds that
have not graduated from high school and are not attending high school currently.  Changes in
CPS interviewing and editing procedures may make data on event dropout rates in the late
1990s inconsistent with previous data.
III.  How Important Is It To Improve the Competencies that Minimum Competency
Examinations Assess?
Lerner (1990) reports that exam scores were raised by the introduction of MCE’s in
many southern states. Opponents of MCEs sometimes dismiss findings such as Lerner’s by
arguing that the tests she used to track student performance over time and the MCE’s themselves
assess low level literacy skills that are not all that important in the economy.  The MCE graduation
requirement, some argue, will distort teaching.  Teachers will focus on developing “low level” literacy
skills rather than the “high order problem solving skills,” writing skills, computer skills, occupation
specific skills or affective competencies that are presumed “more important.”  They argue that
exams similar to the MCE’s used by many states have weak relationships with wages and labor
market success.  Where is the sense, they argue, in threatening to deny a credential--the high
school diploma--that employers reward very handsomely in order to induce teachers to teach and
students to learn basic reading and math literacy skills that employers do not reward by paying
higher wages.
 It is quite true that in the years immediately after high school graduation, exams measuring
these basic competencies have very small effects on wage rates and earnings.   Effects are small
for recent high school graduates because few employers use tests assessing basic literacy skills to
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help them screen job applicants and most do not ask for information on high school grades.  Over
time, however, they learn about the competencies of their new employees by observing job
performance.  Those judged most competent are more likely to get further training, promotions and
good recommendations when they move on.  Poor performers are encouraged to leave.  Since
academic achievement in high school is correlated with job performance (Bishop 1990), the sorting
process results in a rising correlation between exam scores and  labor market success as the
worker ages (Farber and Gibbons 1996).  Altonji and Pierret’s (1997) analysis of the NLSY found
that, in a model in which schooling and the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) competed for
influence, a one standard deviation (SD) increase in the AFQT raised the wage rates of those out of
school only one year by only 2.8 percent.  For those out of school for 12 years, a one SD increase
in AFQT raised the wage rates by 16 percent.  By contrast, the percentage impact of a year of
schooling decreased with time out of school from 9.2 percent for those out just one year to 3
percent for those out for 12 years.
When literacy and academic achievement are measured contemporaneously (rather than
decades earlier when the individual was in high school), their effects on earnings and
unemployment of adults are even larger. When adults are examined, simple tests assessing
literacy have at least as strong a relationship with unemployment and earnings as years of
schooling.  Table 5 present evidence for this assertion from the National Adult Literacy Survey.
Adults in the top prose literacy group earn three times as much as those in the bottom literacy
group and have one-fifth the chance of being unemployed.  College graduates, by contrast, earn
2.35 times as much as high school dropouts and have two-fifths the chance of being unemployed.
Table 5:  Impact of Literacy and Schooling on the Earnings and Unemployment of Males
Prose
Literacy
Earnings Unemployment
Rate--1992
Schooling Earnings Unemployment
Rate--1992
Level  1 $48,965 2.3 % BA or more $38,115 4.8 %
Level  2 $39,941 4.1 % Assoc.
Degree
$31,855 5.5 %
Level  3 $29,610 6.4 % 13-15 yrs $27,279 7.4 %
Level  4 $22,046 11.5 % 12 yrs $22,494 8.2 %
Level  5 $15,755 14.9 % 9-11 yrs $16,194 12.4 %
Source: National Adult Literacy Survey of 1992, National Center for Education Statistics, Li eracy in
the Labor Force.
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IV. The Effect of Minimum Competency Examination Graduation Requirements on
College Attendance and Wages
Proponents of MCEs argue that they force teachers to set higher standards for all students,
not just for middle class white students or for students in honors or college prep classes.  All
students (and students from lower income backgrounds in particular) will have to take tougher
courses and study harder.  The students who are at risk of failing the minimum competency exam
will get more attention and tutoring from school staff.  They will learn more and that will result in (1)
more of them entering, staying in and completing college and, (2) holding completed schooling
constant, their getting better jobs.
 MCE’s are hypothesized to improve job opportunities in two ways.  First, by improving
student achievement they raise worker productivity (Bishop 1990).  Even when this does not
immediately raise workers’ earnings, the effect of academic achievement on wages grows with time
and eventually becomes very large.
The second way MCEs improve job opportunities is by sending a signal to employers that
“ALL the graduates of this high school meet or exceed your hiring standards.”  The fact that they
have passed the MCE is the proof.  In most communities, competencies developed in the local high
school are poorly signaled to employers. The lack of signals of achievement in high school tends to
make employers with the best jobs reluctant to risk hiring recent high school graduates.  Indeed
they often carry in their head very negative stereotypes regarding recent high school graduates.  A
black personnel director interviewed for a CBS special on the educational reform proudly stated,
"We don't hire high school graduates any more, we need skilled workers" (CBS, September 6,
1990).   They prefer, instead, to hire workers with many years of work experience because the
applicant's work record serves as a signal of competence and reliability that helps them identify the
most qualified.
Establishing a minimum competency exam, therefore, is one way a high a school district or
state education system can try to overcome this signaling problem and help it’s graduates get good
jobs.  The existence of the minimum competency exam (MCE) graduation requirement is well
known to local employers.  With the MCE requirement, the school’s diploma now signals more than
just seat time; it signals meeting or exceeding certain minimum standards in reading, writing and
mathematics. This should make local employers more willing to hire the school’s recent graduates.
Because of the negative stereotypes that so many employers have regarding minority youth, the
MCE graduation requirement should be particularly helpful to minority youth.
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 The foregoing logic generates a number of testable predictions regarding the graduates
of high schools with a MCE graduation requirement.  Holding constant socio-economic status
(SES), test scores, grades, types of courses taken, working during senior year, current and
past college attendance and a complete set of other individual and school characteristics,
graduates of MCE high schools will:
1. Be more likely to go to college. This will be particularly true for black and Hispanic
students, for those from low income backgrounds and for those with low test scores.
2. Be less likely to drop out of college.
3. Be more likely to complete a bachelors degree within five years.
4. Be offered higher paying jobs. This will be particularly true for Hispanic and African-
American students and for those from low income backgrounds.
5. The tendency of employers to reward graduates of schools with MCEs will be visible in
data on wage rates in the first year after high school graduation.
These hypotheses were tested in the two nationally representative longitudinal data
sets— High School and Beyond (HSB) seniors of 1980 and the National Educational
Longitudinal Study students graduating in 1992—that contain information on MCEs mandated
by state law or local school boards. The analysis sample are the students in the two
longitudinal studies who graduated from high school between January and September of their
scheduled year of graduation. The HSB seniors were interviewed two, four and six years after
graduating from high school about continued schooling, employment, earnings, and changes
in family status, so we are able to assess both short and intermediate run effects of school
characteristics.  NELS 1992 graduates were interviewed two years after graduation.
The regression models predicting college attendance and wages included controls for
reading and math test scores in 12th grade, grade point average, courses taken in high school,
extra-curricular activities, work for pay during senior year, TV and homework hours, religion,
reading for pleasure, attitudes, an indicator for being handicapped, family demographics,
marital and parental status at the end of 12th grade, dummies for region and rural, suburban
and urban residence and six variables describing the quality of the school.  The variables
describing the quality of the school were a dummy variable for Catholic school and for other
private schools, average teacher salary, proportion of teachers with a Masters degree or more,
average daily pupil attendance rate and principal reports of school problems.iii Wh n wage
rates or earnings are the dependent variable, months attending college full-time and months
attending college part-time (both current and past) are included as control variables.
Otherwise the models predicting wages and the models predicting college attendance were the
same.  The results of the analysis for graduates categorized by gender and by reading and
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mathematics test scores are presented in Table 5.  Results for graduates categorized by socio-
economic status and ethnicity are presented in Table 6.
Table 5: Effects of Requiring Passage of a Minimum Competency Exam
to Graduate from High School
Reading & Math Test Scores Gender
Low Middle High Male Female
Log Avg Wage Rate
  Class of 1980 in 1981 .025
( 1.45)
.020*
(1.74)
.005
(  .40)
.017
( 1.45)
.016
(1.63)
  Class of 1980 in 1984 .041*
(1.85)
- .025
(-1.57)
- .010
(- .56)
-.012
( .75)
.007
(  .52)
  Class of 1980 in 1986 .021
(1.02)
.029*
(1.85)
.010
(  .53)
.017
( 1.05)
.034**
(2.45)
  Class of 1992 in 1992-94 - .049
(1.46)
.052***
(2.63)
.063***
(2.65)
.041**
(2.18)
.032*
(1.69)
Earnings  (1992 $)
  Class of 1980 in 1981 460*
(1.60)
- 207
( .99)
- 151
( .72)
-  12
( .05)
161
( .96)
  Class of 1980 in 1982 -  41
( .11)
-  89
( .32)
-  80
( .30)
- 148
( .53)
193
( .82)
  Class of 1980 in 1983 - 240
( .63)
40
( .13)
- 163
( .54)
-302
(1.01)
227
(  .95)
  Class of 1980 in 1984 77
( .17)
380
(1.59)
291
( .77)
473
(1.40)
320
(1.16)
  Class of 1980 in 1985 474
(1.01)
1077***
(2.89)
368
(  .79)
979**
(2.52)
758**
(2.33)
  Class of 1992 in 1993 60
(  .16)
424**
(2.21)
158
(  .93)
269
(1.28)
208
(1.40)
College Attendance
  Class of 1980 in 1981/82 .043***
(3.19)
.011
( .83)
-.009
( -.59)
.017
( 1.43)
-.000
(- .07)
  Class of 1980 in 1982/83 .038***
(2.51)
.043***
(2.99)
-.006
(-.33)
.018
(1.39)
.024**
(1.88)
  Class of 1980 in 1983/84 .041***
(2.95)
.045***
(3.15)
.007
(.38)
.026**
(1.93)
.026**
(2.06)
  Class of 1980 in 1984 .011
( .857)
.022*
(1.62)
.018
(.94)
.021
(  1.59)
.008
(0.65)
  Class of 1980 in 1985 -.001
( .069)
.003
( .21)
.02
( 1.16)
-.013
(  .92)
.002
( .16)
  Class of 1980 in 1986 .015
( .91)
-.017
(-1.09)
-.01
( .85)
-.011
(  .97)
-.002
( -.16)
Class of 1992 in 1992-94
      Full time
.011
(  .52)
.017
(1.04)
- .004
( .24)
- .009
(  .57)
.029**
(1.99)
Class of 1992 in 1992-94
      Part time
- .001
( .06)
.008
( .90)
.005
(  .58)
.016**
(2.09)
.002
(  .26)
Source: Analysis of follow up data for High School and Beyond-Senior Cohort and NELS-88.  Sample is all students
who graduated from high school during calendar 1980 or 1992. All models contain a full set of background
variables including test scores and grades.  In addition, models predicting earnings and wage rates contain controls
for the number of months spent attending college full-time and months spent attending part-time.
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Table 6: Effects of Requiring Passage of a Minimum Competency Exam
to Graduate from High School
Socio-Economic Status   Race/Ethnicity
Log Wage Rate Low Middle High White
African-
American Hispanic
 Class of 1980  in 1981  .036**
(2.08)
 .017*
(1.69)
-.012
( .78)
-.005
(  .56)
  .042**
(2.20)
 .037**
(2.17)
 Class of 1980  in 1983 - .017
(  .73)
-.006
(  .42)
 .005
(  .25)
-.015
( 1.10)
 -.014
(- .54)
  .045*
(1.85)
 Class of 1980  in 1985   .019
(  .83)
  .025*
( 1.79)
 .011
(  .52)
 .008
( .61)
  .031
(1.28)
  .046**
(1.98)
 Class of 1992  in 1992-94   .039
(1.27)
  .037**
 (2.11)
  .049
 (1.61)
.047***
(3.09)
 -.007
 (  .22)
 -.007
 (  .22)
Earnings (in current $)
  Class of 1980  in 1981  194
(1.09)
113
( .93)
- 286*
(1.74)
-161
(1.45)
 93
( .54)
500**
(2.37)
  Class of 1980 in 1982 - 86
( .34)
  69
( .40)
-113
( .51)
-227
(1.46)
111
( .44)
402
(1.42)
  Class of 1980 in 1983 - 220
( .83)
  64
( .33)
- 149
( .39)
-208
(1.16)
    5
(  .02)
477
(1.56)
  Class of 1980 in 1984   0
( .00)
264
(1.21)
103
( .32)
117
( .56)
470
(1.39)
330
( .91)
  Class of 1980 in 1985 377
(1.02)
620**
(2.27)
286
(  .72)
484*
(1.88)
808**
(2.05)
703*
(1.67)
 Class of 1992 in 1993 694**
(2.22)
 171
 ( .94)
 107
(  .54)
318**
(2.31)
   59
 ( .18)
  59
 ( .18)
College Attendance
  Class of 1980 in 1981/82 .027*
(1.72)
.008
(  .70)
-.008
( .49)
.000
( .01)
.011
( .59)
.031*
(1.77)
  Class of 1980 in 1982/83 .022
(1.26)
.018
(1.37)
.032*
(1.66)
.018
(1.41)
.032
(1.56)
.039**
(2.04)
  Class of 1980 in 1983/84 .024
(1.42)
.027**
(2.12)
.030
(1.52)
.032**
(2.49)
.038*
(1.89)
.011
( .62)
   Class of 1980 in 1984 .004
( .28)
.013
(1.02)
.029
(1.32)
.022*
(1.66)
-.002
(  .09)
.002
( .09)
   Class of 1980 in 1985 -.009
( .53)
.013
( .98)
.004
( .16)
.009
( .64)
-.014
( .070)
.022
(1.10)
   Class of 1980 in 1986 -.012
( .59)
-.011
( .77)
.005
( .24)
-.009
( .64)
-.007
( .32)
.007
( .34)
   Class of 1992 in 1992-94
        Full-time
 .032
( 1.49)
 .011
( .72)
-.003
( .18)
 .011
( .93)
 .018
( .69)
 .018
( .69)
  Class of 1992 in 1992-94
        Part-time
 .012
(1.11)
 .013
(1.60)
 .001
(  .07)
.010*
(1.71)
 .010
 ( .73)
.010
 ( .73)
Source: Analysis of follow up data for High School and Beyond-Senior Cohort and NELS-88.  Sample is all students who graduated from high
school during calendar 1980 or 1992. All models contain a full set of background variables including test scores and grades.  In addition,
models predicting earnings and wage rates contain controls for the number of months spent attending college full-time and months spent
attending part-time.  The 1992 Hispanics and African-American graduates were merged because of insufficient number of observations for
separate analysis.
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College Attendance: The analysis of HSB data found that MCEs had significant
positive effects on the probability of being in college in a majority of subgroups during the four-
year period immediately following high school graduation.  Effects were largest for students in
the middle and bottom of the test score distribution and tended to be greater in the 2nd and 3rd
years out than in the 1st, 4th and subsequent years out.   Socio-economic status also interacts
with MCEs in the way hypothesized.  MCEs have an immediate and significant impact on the
college enrollment of low SES students.  Middle and high SES students are affected but not till
the 2nd and 3rd year out of high school.  For 1992 graduates the same pattern appears to be
developing.  Combining full and part time enrollment, the point estimates imply that MCEs raise
enrollment rates of students from low SES backgrounds by 4.4 percentage points, middle SES
students by 2.4 percentage points and high SES students not at all.  Women graduating from
MCE high schools are significantly more likely to go to college full time and men are
significantly more likely to go part time. When results are broken down by ethnicity, MCEs are
found to effect all groups but effects are somewhat larger (though not significantly so) for
minority students.  Effects were significant in the first year following graduation only for
Hispanics and significant for almost all sub-groups in the 2nd and 3rd year following graduation.
Wage Rates:  For graduates in 1980, MCEs had significant effects on wage rates of
graduates who were in the low and middle test score groups., as hypothesized.  They had no
effect on wages of high test score students.  Students from low and moderate SES
backgrounds, had significantly higher wage rates when they attended MCE high schools.  High
SES students did not.  Finally MCEs appeared to have increased the wage rates of minority
youth but not white youth.  Black youth from MCE high schools were paid a significant 4.2
percent more in the first year after graduating but the effect diminished in later years.  Hispanic
youth graduating from MCE high schools in 1980 were paid consistently (between 3.7 and 4.6
percent) more at one year, 3 years and 5 years following graduation.
The wage rate benefit of graduating from an MCE high school in 1992 is considerably
larger than for 1980 graduates.  MCE graduates in 1992 were paid 4.1 percent extra if they
were male and 3.2 percent extra if they were female.  This compares to average effects of 1.6-
1.7 percent for 1990 graduates.  Who benefits also changed.  MCEs appear to have raised
wage rates of medium and high test score students by an astonishing 5.2 to 6.3 percent, but
possibly lowered wage rates of low test score students by 4.9 percent.  The MCE coefficient
for the low test score group is not significantly less than zero, but it is significantly smaller than
the coefficient in the middle test score group.  SES background no longer interacts with MCEs.
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1992 graduates who attend high schools with MCEs are paid more without regard to their SES
background.   White students who did not benefit in the early 1980s are now benefiting.  The
minority students who in 1980 were the sole beneficiaries of attending a MCE high school no
longer benefited in 1992.
Annual Earnings: The earnings regressions capture the effects of variables on both
time spent working and wage rates.  Except for Hispanics, 1980 graduates of MCE high
schools did not earn more than graduates of non-MCE high schools in the years immediately
following graduation.  Earnings effects grew over time, however, so that by 1985 annual
earnings were $484 higher for whites, $808 higher for blacks and $703 higher for Hispanics.
For 1992 graduates, a number of the subgroups appear to be receiving statistically significant
earnings benefits in the first calendar year after graduating from a MCE high school.  Low SES
students who graduate from a MCE high school earn $694 extra, a more than ten percent
increase in earnings.  Students from the middle of the test score distribution earn $424 extra (a
7.5 percent increase) when they graduate from a MCE high school.
The reader should be reminded that all of these findings are from regressions that
control for the quality of the high school and the individual’s academic achievement—test
scores, grade point average, participation in extra-curricular activities and an indicator for
taking remedial courses in either math or English.  Apparently, the existence of the MCE raises
achievement in ways not captured by individual test scores and this has long run effects on the
student’s ability to complete college and get higher paying jobs.
Now let us summarize the last three sections of the paper.  The MCEs that were in
existence in the 1980s and early 1990s did not lower high school completion rates as some
have feared.  Instead they have increased college attendance and college retention rates.
Students who graduated from MCE high schools immediately obtained significantly higher
paying jobs and kept their pay advantage for the next five years.  In addition, large earnings
benefits appeared five years after high school graduation. The immediate wage rate benefits
of graduating from a MCE high school were  larger for the people graduating in 1992 than in
1980 though who is benefiting had a less egalitarian bias in 1992 than in the early 1980s.
MCEs are changing.  New states and cities such as Chicago, Ohio and Massachusetts
have introduced them.  Other states such as New Jersey and New York are improving their
exams (by adding essays and open response questions) and raising the standard that must be
achieved to graduate.  While MCEs of the past have not increased dropout rates, that does not
guarantee that MCEs that set much higher minimum standards will not have that effect.
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The most dramatic increase in graduation standards is in New York State.   The next
section of the paper provides background on New York State’s Regents examination system
and plans to reform it by requiring ALL students to take and pass Regents exams in five core
subjects.  The succeeding section reports on the high schools that jumped the gun on this
reform.  The schools studied eliminated bottom track classes in the early 1990s and required
instead that all students to take demanding “Regents” courses in five core subjects.  The
primary change has been a massive redirection of energy and attention to struggling students.
V.  The New York State Regents Examinations
New York State has been administering curriculum-based Regents Examinations to high
school students ever since June 1878.  As Sherman Tinkelman, Assistant Commissioner for
Examinations and Scholarships described in a 1966  report:
The Regents examinations are closely related to the curriculum in New York State.
They are, as you can see, inseparably intertwined.  One supports and reinforces the
other.... These instruments presuppose and define standards.... They are a strong
supervisory and instructional tool--and deliberately so.  They are effective in
stimulating good teaching and good learning practices (Tinkelman, 1966 p. 12).
Sponsorship by the state Board of Regents is crucial to the role these examinations have played in
setting and maintaining high standards and promoting reform.  On occasions, examinations have
been deliberately revised to induce changes in curriculum and teaching.
For years our foreign language specialists went up and dow the State beating the
drums for curriculum reform in modern language teaching, for change in emphasis
from formal grammar to conversation skills and reading skills.  There was not very
great impact until we introduced, after notice and with numerous sample exercises,
oral comprehension and reading comprehension into our Regents examinations.
Promptly thereafter, most schools adopted the new curricular objectives (Tinkelman,
1966 p. 12).
The examinations are taken throughout one’s high school career.  A typical student taking a
full schedule of college preparatory Regents courses would take Regents exams in mathematics
and earth science at the end of 9th grade; mathematics, biology and global studies exams at the
end of 10th grade; mathematics, chemistry, English, American history and foreign language exams
at the end of 11th grade and physics exams at the end of 12th grade.  Students who want to take
AP classes in junior and senior year often start taking Regents courses and exams in 8th grade.
In 1996, the ratio of the number of students taking the Mathematics Course 1 exam to
average enrollment in a high school grade was 89 percent and, of these, 28 percent scored below
the 65% passing grade.  Participation percentages were in the 60s for the global studies, American
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history, biology and English exams.  Failure rates were 25 percent in global studies, 19 percent in
American history, 25 percent in biology and 20 percent in English.  Those not taking Regents
exams were typically in “local” courses that are considerably less challenging than Regents
courses.  A system of Regents competency exams (RCTs) in reading, writing, math, science global
studies and U.S. history and government set a minimum standard for those not taking Regents
courses.
For students the stakes attached to Regent exams are not high.iv   Exam grades count for
less than an eighth of the final grade in the course and influence only the type of diploma received.
College admissions decisions depend primarily on grades and SAT scores, not Regents exam
scores.  Employers ignore exam results when making hiring decisions.  Students are aware that
they can avoid Regents courses and still go to college.  Indeed some perceive an advantage to
avoiding them:
My counselor wanted me to take Regents history and I did for a while.  But it
was pretty hard and the teacher moved fast.  I switched to the other history
and I'm getting better grades.  So my average will be better for college.  Unless
you are going to a college in the state, it doesn't really matter whether you get
a Regent's diploma. (Ward, 1994)
Indeed, the modest payoff to taking Regents exams may be one of the reasons why so many
students have not been taking Regents courses.  In 1996/97 only 42 percent of graduating seniors
got a Regents Diploma signifying they took a series of Regents (or above) level academic courses
and passed the associated exams.
The Statewide Shift to All-Regents
This is about to change.  The Board of Regents has announced that students graduating in
the year 2000 must take a new six hour Regents English examination and pass it at the 55% level.
The class of 2001 has the additional requirement of passing an examination in algebra and
geometry.  The class of 2002 must also pass Regents examinations in global studies and American
history as well.  When laboratory science exams come on stream, the phase in of all five new
required Regents exams will be completed with the graduating class of 2003.  The new
requirements will effectively abolish the bottom track.  Everyone, including those pursuing
vocational programs at area vocational technical schools, will be required to achieve the standard in
the five core subjects that used to be what was expected of those going to four year colleges.
 In a number of subjects the Regents examinations are being revised.  The revised exams
are if anything more demanding than the exams they replace.  See www.nysed.gov/rscs/test123.html for
copies of new or old regents exams, scoring rubrics and a complete description of the testing
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program.  Once schools have adjusted to the revised exams and the requirement that all students
take them, the Regents intend to raise the scores necessary to pass from the 55%  level to 60%
and then to 65%.  New York State is embarked on establishing the first high stakes curriculum-
based external exit examination system in United States history.
VI. All Regents High Schools: How did they do it?
What kinds of changes in school policies and resource allocation will be
necessary to move to an All-Regents curriculum in the 5 core subjects?  This question
was addressed by interviewing teachers, administrators and school board members at ten high
schools that had already moved to an All-Regents curriculum and have significantly increased
the number of students taking and passing Regents exams.  The method of drawing the
sample and conducting the interview is described in Monk and Hussein (1997) and will not be
repeated here.  The site visitors wrote a short report about each district.  In eight of the school
districts, interviews were recorded.  About 60 hours of  tape was generated.  The comments
that follow are based on listening to the recorded interviews, a review of the reports and
conversations with the interviewers.
Generating support
 The districts that increased their participation in Regents exams to high levels did not
accomplish the goal quickly and easily.  The key to success was not getting a tax rate increase
through the school board or introducing some new teaching system.  In most cases the formal
and structural changes were modest.  It was the school’s culture—both the teacher culture and
the student peer culture—that had to and did change.
The initiative generally came from a new district superintendent who then recruited or
promoted people into key jobs who would support his vision for the elimination of the
bottom/local track.  Staff and community support for eliminating local/basic classes in core
subjects was carefully cultivated.  In many cases the goal of shifting to an All-Regents
curriculum was not announced until many years after important initial steps had been taken
and some early successes had been achieved. The new superintendent had to deal with that
fact that teachers and the community felt that the school was already doing a great job. They
took pride in the accomplishments of the honors students.  How could they be convinced to
end the low expectations basic/local track into which struggling and lazy students were
fleeing?   The Regents exams and the report card outlining district level results provided the
benchmark that the superintendent was able to use to shame and inspire teachers to set high
standards for all students.  As one superintendent put it:
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“External validation of what you’re doing and forcing teachers,
administrators and the community to look at yourself as reflected in the
eyes of people outside of you and matching a standard that exists outside
your school district was critical!”
The long history and prestige of Regents exams helped in selling the reform to parents.
“All-Regents was …helpful for us.  It was very concrete.  It was something
the parents could relate to.  When parents thought of a Regents program in
their own experience, they thought about students who were college
bound. (School board president of an All-Regents school district)
Outside recognition was sought and excellence awards were frequently received.
“The whole community is walking around with their chests out.  Which
really helps out.  There is a pride that this is what _____ is today.”(School
board president of an All-Regents school district).  [All Regents] put us up on a
new standard.  It made a change in the high school and [brought] the
recognition of this high school as a place were positive things are
happening. (President of the teachers union local in an All-Regents school
district)
The outside recognition increased teacher and community support for the initiative.  Praise for
past accomplishments spurred teachers to raise standards even higher and work harder still.
The focus on the external standard meant that the professional pride of the teachers became
invested in getting marginal students “through the Regents.”  The visibility of each success
made the extra work seem worthwhile.
Eliminating the local/basic track and the general increase in standards persuaded more
students to take honors, Advanced Placement and International Baccalaureate classes.
“Every level of kid in that classroom is getting a new challenge.  Because
we are an All-Regents high school, we are offering more AP classes.  Kids
are ready for that next challenge.”
A Focus on Struggling Students.
All of the districts substantially increased the time and resources devoted to teaching
and tutoring struggling students.  Since they had initiated the raising of the bar, school
administrators felt a moral obligation to do everything in their power to help students succeed.
“You need to . . . provide the remedial and tutorial support that every
individual kid needs.  It’s a terrible thing to put in a tough program that
kids are going to fail.  Every one of these kids can do it - they take a
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different amount of time to do it.” (School board president in an All-Regents
School District)
The guidance counselor met with incoming freshman and developed a plan whose goal was
obtaining a Regents diploma.  The milestones were tracked and if a student started having
difficulties the counselor arranged tutoring .  The extra time was obtained in a variety of ways:
· More homework was assigned—especially for students formerly in local courses.
· Struggling students were assigned to Stretch Regents courses that take 1.5 or 2 years to
cover material conventionally covered in one year in a standard Regents course.
· Struggling students were assigned to classes with more than 5 periods a week.  A number
of the schools that settled on this option had tried 2 year Stretch Regents courses and felt
that extra time in a one year period worked better.
· Increased summer school attendance especially for struggling primary and middle school
students.
· Study halls were reduced (because most students “do not use study halls productively”)
and  regular tutoring sessions were substituted.
· Extra periods at the beginning or end of the school day were added and used for giving
struggling students extra help.
· Students in the National Honors Society and the International Baccalaureate program
provided peer tutoring.
 Teachers were Inspired to Work Harder
 “[Teachers] worked above and beyond the contract.  Nobody asks them to
do it….I’ve never  worked in a place like this before!”(Principal of an All-
Regents high school)
 “The [teachers] were willing to give their every effort and time above and
beyond the school day.  They would stay for hours on end late in
the...evening.... She [the principal] presented it so well.  She’s just a
motivator!”  (School secretary at the same All-Regents high school)
 In many schools the increase in teacher time devoted to tutoring was also
accomplished by relieving them of hall duties and supervision of study hall and lunch room.  In
one school the position of department chair was eliminated and the released time formerly
given to department chairs was reallocated to teaching and tutoring.  In some schools teaching
assignments were no longer allocated by seniority.   The best teachers were reassigned to
classes with lots of struggling students.  In some schools teaching assistants who were fully
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qualified teachers were hired to provide tutoring. Night time review sessions were offered in
the months preceding the Regents exams. Teacher contracts were not renegotiated, but local
union leaders sometimes chose not to make an issue of things that in the past might have led
to a grievance.
 In one district many teachers could not adapt to the new way of doing things and left.
Young teachers who believed the All-Regents goal was both desirable and feasible were hired
as replacements.
 
 VII.  Implications for State Policy
 Requiring that all students reach the Regents standard in 5 core subjects will
significantly increase student achievement, college attendance and completion and the quality
of jobs that students get after high school.   The biggest beneficiaries of the policy will be the
students, often from disadvantaged backgrounds, who have been encouraged or allowed to
avoid rigorous courses in the past.  In the All-Regents high schools there was a major
reallocation of teacher time and resources towards struggling students.  It was their
achievement that increased the most.  Administrators reported that college enrollment rates
went up after they shifted to All Regents.
 It is not clear, however, that the parents of struggling students will see it that way.
When the principal of an All-Regents high school was asked who opposed the elimination of
the easier local courses, she said:
 “Parents of children…who…felt [their kids] couldn’t do it….[One parent
approached her in the school parking lot]  “She started yelling at me.  She told
me she hated the all Regents high school.  Her kids were not as
successful.  If you sit in a consumer math class you get a 90.   If you sit in
a sequential math class, you have to struggle to get a 65….She was very
angry about it….Parents are a big obstacle…. Your kids don’t want to do
this.  They’re going to complain about it.  Which means you are going to
work harder as a parent.”
 Once students start failing Regents exams and having to repeat courses in order to graduate,
there will be a crescendo of complaints.  Claims will be made that schools have not done
enough to help students succeed on the new exams.  What can the Regents and the state
legislature do to help local schools meet their obligation to help students meet the new higher
standards?  How can the number of dropouts and graduation delays be minimized?
The New York State Reform Strategy                                                                                                                        WP 98-27
Page 24
 The most important change is to increase the amount of time that struggling
students spend on the task of learning.  This is not just this author’s judgement.  It is also
the central recommendation of a representative group of teachers, school administrators and
parent representatives that was convened by New York State’s Commissioner of Education to
recommend to the Board of Regents means of minimizing the number of students failing to
meet the new higher learning standards.  This group, inelegantly named the “Safety Net Study
Group,” recommended a radical increase in the amount of instruction that struggling and
disadvantaged students receive.  I will quote extensively from their final recommendations:
 “The success of this upgrading of standards will depend on a systemic program
of prevention and intervention strategies that each district and, in turn, each
school must provide.  These strategies include, but are not limited to:
· Providing extra learning opportunities through extended time for students in
need of this service.
· Providing clear direction to students and their parents of what is expected of
the student, what is the student’s current academic status and what the
student still needs to do to earn a Regents diploma.
· Providing a transitional program from elementary to middle school and from
middle school to high school.
· Providing a clearly defined promotional [policy so that all students and their
parents understand the criteria from grade to grade.
 Recommendation 1—Grade Specific Curriculum: Each school district and, in
turn, each school should be required to have grade specific curriculum
consistent with State standards….If a district does not meet the learning
standards, then State intervention procedures will be implemented. [Schools
Under Registration Review is the state’s intervention program].
 Recommendation 2—Extra Help/Extra Time: Each school district should
have, at every grade level, an assessment system to provide information on
student performance and to prepare all students to meet the
standards….Enrichment and remediation programs should be provided as
additions to and to reinforce core courses of study as opposed to” pullout”
programs. [Pullout programs take struggling students out of their regular class to
give them small group instruction by a resource teacher].  The state should
revise the commissioner’s Regulations on remediation,…to require that students
receive the extra help/extra time they may need to meet the standards.  These
students enrichment and remedial activities will be provided within the school
year, including after school instruction, evening instruction, Saturday instruction,
etc.
 Recommendation 3—Mandatory Summer School: When a student fails to
meet academic expectations, based on grade-level assessments, then that
students would be required to attend summer school….Since the State is
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responsible for summer school, it would need both to revise the current summer
school requirements and procedures to accommodate this expansion and to
review and revise the current assessments provided during the summer
sessions ….In addition the State would provide the necessary financial
assistance to support the extra cost of mandatory summer school.
 Recommendation 4—Professional Development:….Each district should
provide professional development to all staff, kindergarten  through grade 12, to
enable them to assist students to meet the new graduation requirements….
 Recommendation 5—Student Promotional Guidelines:  Each school district
should have a plan that explains the movement of students from grade to grade
(especially when they move between different school buildings) and identifies
the ways that schools engage parents, students and other community members
to help students understand and achieve higher standards….v (Safety Net Study
Group, June 22, 1998)”
 Schools with large numbers of struggling students should probably just lengthen the
school day and school year for all students, not just a targeted minority who are behind the
rest.  The Edison Schools have been successful with this approach.  A non-Edison public
school in Massachusetts has successfully copied the idea.  Why not either contract with
Edison to take over some urban public schools in New York or implement the idea in a few
pilot schools?
 The All-Regents schools I studied obtained large increases in teacher contact time with
students by reorganizing teacher time and getting teachers to work above and beyond their
contracted hours.  Inspiring leadership that induces teachers to work way beyond the contract
for no additional pay will not be available in most districts.  Consequently, teachers will have to
be paid extra for working longer hours.  Costs of tutoring, longer school days, review sessions
and staff development that are associated with preparing students for Regents exams should
not be subject to caps in state funding formulas.  A special funding formula should be
developed for districts that have large numbers of disadvantaged pupils and low first grade test
scores.
 One of the most effective forms of professional development is serving on the
committees that grade essays, multi-step mathematics problems and extended answer
questions.  Canadian teachers who have served on grading committees for their provincial
exams describe it as  “a wonderful professional development activity (Bob 1996).”  Having to
agree on what constituted excellent, good, poor, and failing responses to essay questions or open-
ended science and math problems resulted in a sharing of perspectives and teaching tips that most
found very helpful.  Therefore, teachers should grade the Regents exams in centralized
The New York State Reform Strategy                                                                                                                        WP 98-27
Page 26
regional locations under the guidance of well-trained leaders.  Scoring rubrics would be
developed centrally so as to maintain consistent standards across the state.
 What will happen to Dropout Rates?
 Anticipating the new requirements, many school districts have already started shifting
to an all-Regents curriculum and the numbers of students taking Regents level courses and
passing Regents exams is rising.  Between 1995 and 1997 the proportion of students taking
and passing Regents exams at the 65% correct level rose from 50.3 to 56.3 percent in English,
from 53 to 59 percent in Sequential Mathematics I and from 41 to 44 percent in Biology.
 Nevertheless, we predict extremely high failure rates—between 30 and 50 percent in
some subjects--the first time Regents Exams are administered to all students.  Even if the
reforms proposed above were implemented immediately, they would not have been in
operation long enough to prevent this from happening.  Many students will have to retake
examinations after taking additional academic courses or special summer makeup courses.
Will this generate a large increase in dropout rates as students despair of ever passing all five
exams?   We think not. Our prediction is that New York students will respond the same way
that European students respond to tough graduation requirements, they will study harder and
stay in high school longer.  The tougher graduation requirements are not fully phased in until
the class of 2003.  We predict that 4 years later, in 2007, that drop out rates will be at or below
current levels and this will be accomplished without making the Regents Exams easier than
they are right now.   We base this forecast on the following:
· When they discover how difficult the standards are, we expect students to react by
studying harder.  Teachers will gain experience with teaching to the new standards and will
get better at it.  Teachers who are unable to teach to the higher standards will leave the
profession and be replaced by teachers who can.
· We expect the fire storm that will result from the high failure rates in the first year to
generate a large infusion of state aid directed specifically at helping struggling students
and schools serving disadvantaged populations.  The impending rise in graduation
standards helped convince the legislature to increase school aid in the most recent budget
cycle and much of it was targeted on expanding after-school programs and summer
schools.
· The high stakes exam will make teacher quality much more critical than in the past.  The
competition for quality teachers will drive their wages up.  Parent support of more school
spending will increase.
· We predict the plan to increase the 55 percent passing standard on the Regents Exams to
60 and then 65 percent will be indefinitely postponed.
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· The Regents Examination graduation requirement replaces a Regents Competency Exam
graduation requirement that already sets a pretty high minimum, so the change in failure
rates will not be as dramatic as many expect.  In 1996, the ratio of the number of students
failing a RCT to average enrollment per grade in the state was 21 percent in Mathematics
and Global Studies and 20 percent in Science.  In New York City failure ratios on the RCT
were above 40 percent in these three subjects.
· The Regents exam graduation requirement does not apply to all high school students in
the state.  The ten percent of students who are in private schools are not covered. Special
education students with an Individual Education Plan are exempted.
· Many of the students who are unable to pass all five Regents exams at the 55% level will
complete high school by transferring to a private high school or a GED program.  A transfer
to a GED program is considered a switch to another kind of school, not dropping out of
school.
Let us imagine, however, that our prediction of stable or rising high school completion
rates is wrong.  Would a 2 to 4 percent decline in completion rates imply that increasing
graduation requirements was a mistake?  No.  Focusing solely on graduation rates mistakes
symbol for substance.  What counts is how much students learn, not what proportion of them
have a specific paper credential.  It is the competencies developed in high school that enable a
student to survive and thrive in college, not the diploma. Many community colleges admit
students without diplomas.  Higher standards will result in all students learning more on
average (Bishop 1997).  Those who graduate will be more competent and will be able to
command a better wage in the labor market. Section IV of the paper demonstrated that this
effect is quite large—MCEs cause a 3 to 4 percent increase in average wage rates. The
average high school dropout will also be more competent and this too will result in higher pay.
College attendance rates will be higher, and those affected in this way are big gainers.  There
will be losers--the hypothesized 2 to 4 percent of the age cohort that would have graduated
under the old standards but do not under the new higher standards regime.  Altonji and
Pierret’s regression predicts that dropping out generates about an 18 percent reduction in
earnings in the first year out of school and a 6 percent loss in the 12th year out [assuming no
change in test scores].  These losses pale by comparison to the 3+ percent wage rate gains
experienced by the 96 to 98 percent of young people whose years of completed schooling are
not changed or are increased by the higher standards.
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APPENDIX   I
Sample Regressions
_NELS-88 MALE COMPLETE SAMPLE                        19:07 Saturday, July 11, 1998  22
Model: MODEL1
Dependent Variable: LOGWAGES
Analysis of Variance
                          Sum of         Mean
Source          DF       Squares       Square      F Value       Prob > F
Model           71        46.35061      0.65283        3.407       0.0001
Error         3359     643.54444  0.19159
C Total       3430    689.89505
    Root MSE    0.43771     R-square       0.0672
    Dep Mean       1.68830     Adj R-sq        0.0475
    C.V.              25.92588
Parameter Estimates
Parameter     Standard        T for H0:                     Variable
Variable  DF     Estimate          Error            Parameter=0    Prob > |T|     Label
INTERCEP   1      1.512304    0.19177607         7.886        0.0001  Intercept
VOCATIO    1      0.015050    0.00689323         2.183        0.0291
SQVOCA     1   0.000092935    0.00173698         0.054        0.9573
ACADEMI    1     -0.000131    0.00320617        -0.041        0.9673
SQACAD     1     -0.000318    0.00035048        -0.908        0.3641
DIFICULT   1      0.009185    0.00994208         0.924        0.3556
DUMYDIFI   1      0.024662    0.04406341         0.560     0.5757
GRADE12    1     -0.003998    0.01561136        -0.256        0.7979
TMATH      1      0.001595    0.00139726         1.142        0.2536                           
TREAD      1     -0.002676    0.00118840        -2.252        0.0244
TESTBIS2        1          0.041497         0.01978478         2.097        0.0360  Min. Competency
Exam Grad Req
SCHOCATO   1      0.068566    0.03970959         1.727        0.0843
PRIVATE    1      0.087156    0.03932715         2.216        0.0267                
AVA2       1      0.004951    0.16725518         0.030        0.9764
DUMYAVA    1      0.008100    0.02768773         0.293        0.7699
TEACMAD2   1      0.002474    0.03751178         0.066        0.9474
DUMYMADO   1     -0.000625    0.02393683        -0.026        0.9792
TEACWAG2   1      0.007629    0.00316194         2.413        0.0159
DUMYTEWG   1      0.015946    0.03251527         0.490        0.6239
HISPANIC   1     -0.044447    0.02731437        -1.627        0.1038
INDIAN     1      0.085595    0.07732401         1.107        0.2684
ASIAN      1      0.033167    0.03324571         0.998        0.3185                  
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BLACK      1     -0.014733    0.03145125        -0.468        0.6395
DEPCHILD   1      0.052219    0.05333683         0.979        0.3276
MARSTAT    1     -0.007511    0.06968022        -0.108        0.9142  Current marital status
MALEFAM    1     -0.120223    0.04874150        -2.467        0.0137
FEMAFAM    1     -0.018147    0.0235 295        -0.770        0.4411
DIVORFAM   1      0.008205    0.02456843         0.334        0.7384
SIBLING    1     -0.004543    0.00380413        -1.194        0.2325
DUMYSIBL   1     -0.071790    0.05121415        -1.402        0.1611
RELIGIO    1     -0.000627    0.01750010        -0.036        0.9714                    
HOMEWOR2   1      0.002152    0.00143054         1.505        0.1325
DUMYHOME   1     -0.030206    0.05222774        -0.578        0.5631
HOURSTV2   1      0.003032    0.00473424         0.640        0.5220
LIDEVARS   1      0.030721    0.02492967         1.232        0.2179
DUMYLIVA   1      0.058721    0.08264269         0.711        0.4774
LIDINTRA   1     -0.014540    0.03170235        -0.459        0.6465
DUMYLIIN   1      0.091695    0.10242588         0.895        0.3707
LIDEACTI   1    -0.012906    0.01683102        -0.767        0.4433
PARINTRA    1      0.010922    0.02142625         0.510        0.6103                     
PARTVARS   1      0.000407    0.02185210         0.019        0.9851
PARTACTI   1      0.021540    0.01161463         1.855        0.0637
LIDECHUR   1     -0.006631    0.04770970        -0.139        0.8895
PARTCHUR   1     -0.012315    0.02026287        -0.608        0.5434
HANDICA    1     -0.029730    0.03737849        -0.795        0.4264
READING    1      0.000965    0.00809356         0.119        0.9051
CUTCLAS2   1      0.040659    0.01616394         2.515        0.0119
SUSPEN2    1      0.043828    0.02916211         1.503        0.1330
URBAN      1     -0.013662    0.02418663        -0.565        0.5722                       
SUBURBAN   1      0.003941    0.01967974         0.200        0.8413
MIDWEST    1     -0.013764    0.02498223        -0.551        0.5817
SOUTH      1     -0.026810    0.02492725        -1.076        0.2822
WEST       1      0.057772    0.02854600         2.024        0.0431
SES        1      0.034702    0.01266373         2.740        0.0062
WKSENIOR    1      0.002809    0.00079959         3.512        0.0004
WKSQ       1      0.000105    0.00006227         1.680     0.0930
LAW2       1      0.037805    0.02912543         1.298        0.1944
SELFCON    1      0.016372    0.00838693         1.952        0.0510                         
LOCUS      1      0.020423    0.00858536         2.379        0.0174
CATHOLI2   1      0.005703    0.02167805         0.263        0.7925
JEWISH     1      0.048884    0.06918527         0.707        0.4799
RELIOTHE   1      0.002207    0.02336125         0.094        0.9248
RELINON2   1     -0.012106    0.02728772        -0.444        0.6573
RELDK      1      0.087424    0.04897600         1.785        0.0743
IMPMONE3   1      0.023924    0.01363065         1.755     0.0793
DUMYMON3   1     -0.184346    0.17388424        -1.060        0.2891
IMPSTEA3   1     -0.007071    0.02011806        -0.351        0.7252                           
DUMYSTE3   1      0.288401    0.17106851         1.686        0.0919
DUMYLIDE   1     -0.182789    0.12918338        -1.415        0.1572
DUMYLICH   1      0.046208    0.06348871         0.728        0.4668
FULMONTH   1     -0.008382    0.00134137        -6.249        0.0001
PARMONTH   1     -0.003251  0.00247160        -1.315        0.1885
The New York State Reform Strategy                                                                                                                        WP 98-27
Page 32
_NELS-88 MALE COMPLETE SAMPLE                                 19:07 Saturday, July 11, 1998  23
Dependent Variable: LOGWAGES
Test: VOCACA   Numerator:      0.8368  DF:    1    F value:   4.3678
               Denominator:  0.191588  DF: 3359   Prob>F:    0.0367
Dependent Variable: LOGWAGES
Test: MPLUSR   Numerator:      0.1287  DF:    1   F value:   0.6716
               Denominator:  0.191588  DF: 3359   Prob>F:    0.4126
Dependent Variable: LOGWAGES
Test: TPLUSGDS  Numerator:      0.0232   DF:    1   F value:   0.1209
               Denominator:  0.191588  DF: 3359   Prob>F:    0.7280
Dependent Variable: LOGWAGES
Test: TPGDSDIF Numerator:      0.0119  DF:    1   F value:   0.0619
               Denominator:  0.191588   DF: 3359   Prob>F:    0.8035
Dependent Variable: LOGWAGES
Test: TEACHP   Numerator:      0.7370  DF:    1   F value:   3.8470
               Denominator:  0.191588  DF: 3359  Prob>F:    0.0499
Dependent Variable: LOGWAGES
Test: MRTEST   Numerator:      0.7003  DF:    1   F value:   3.6554
               Denominator:  0.191588  DF: 3359   Prob>F:    0.0560
Dependent Variable: LOGWAGES
Test: TVREAD   Numerator:      0.0556  DF:    1   F value:   0.2902
               Denominator:  0.191588  DF: 3359   Prob>F:    0.5901
Dependent Variable: LOGWAGES
Test: LWSUSP   Numerator:      0.9217  DF:    1   F value:   4.8108
               Denominator:  0.191588  DF: 3359  Prob>F:    0.0284
Dependent Variable: LOGWAGES
Test: ALLPROB  Numerator:      2.3970  DF:    1   F value:  12.5111
               Denominator:  0.191588  DF: 3359  Prob>F:    0.0004
Dependent Variable: LOGWAGES
Test: RELIGIO  Numerator:      0.0327  DF:    1   F value:   0.1706
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               Denominator:  0.191588 DF: 3359  Prob>F:    0.6796
Dependent Variable: LOGWAGES
Test: SPORTLID Numerator:      0.0482  DF:    1   F value:   0.2516
               Denominator:  0.191588  DF: 3359   Prob>F:    0.6160
Dependent Variable: LOGWAGES
Test: SPORTPAR Numerator:      0.0523  DF:    1   F value:   0.2728
               Denominator:  0.191588  DF: 3359   Prob>F:    0.6015
Dependent Variable: LOGWAGES
Test: LIDPART1 Numerator:      0.2604  DF:    1   F value:   1.3591
               Denominator:  0.191588  DF: 3359   Prob>F:    0.2438
Dependent Variable: LOGWAGES
Test: LIDPART2 Numerator:      0.0231  DF:    1   F value:   0.1208
               Denominator:  0.191588  DF: 3359   Prob>F:    0.7282
Dependent Variable: EMPLTOT2
Test: LIDPART2 Numerator:      0.4580  DF:    1   F value:   4.3318
               Denominator:  0.105719  DF: 5191   Prob>F:    0.0375
Correlation Analysis
  12 'VAR' Variables:  DIFICULT GRADE12  TMATH    TREAD    RELIGIO  HOMEWOR2
HOURSTV2 READING  CUTCLAS2 SUSPEN2  WKSENIOR   LAW2
                                            Simple Statistics
Variable N Mean Std Dev Sum Minimum Maximum
DIFICULT           7173 -0.103222 0.888491 -740.411000 -2.000000 1.000000
GRADE12    6058 1.781355 0.854842 10791 -0.003333 3.955000
TMATH 6649 50.673188 10.420077 336926        30.136719        71.921875
TREAD 6655 49.107222   10.220184  326809 29.007813 68.906250
RELIGIO 7139 0.359014 0.479745 2563.000000 0 1.000000
HOMEWOR2 7173 6.378202 5.558272 45751 0 21.000000
HOURSTV2 7173 2.650189  1.714807 19010 0 6.500000
READING 6706 2.517447 1.022379 16882 1.000000 4.000000
CUTCLAS2 6788 0.553329 0.497184 3756.000000 0 1.000000
SUSPEN2 6790 0.105302 0.306965 715.000000 0 1.000000
WKSENIOR 6877 8.405119 11.381924 57802 0 40.000000
LAW2 6790 0.089249 0.285124 606.000000 0 1.000000
_NELS-88 MALE COMPLETE SAMPLE                           19:07 Saturday, July 11, 1998  13
------ ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                              Simple Statistics
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Variable                N             Mean          Std Dev              Sum          Minimum          Maximum
DIFICULT 7409 0.005745 0.857868 42.568000 -2.000000 1.000000
GRADE12 6158 2.014326 0.843346 12404 -0.003333 3.996667
TMATH 6921 49.723187 9.935973344134 29.628906 71.921875
TREAD 6925 51.057021 9.686763353570 29.117188 68.906250
RELIGIO 7376 0.420418 0.493659 3101.000000 0 1.000000
HOMEWOR2 7409 7.379314 5.635741 54673 0 21.000000
HOURSTV2 7409 2.684980 1.742384 19893 0 6.500000
READING 6972 2.644435 0.997167 18437 1.000000 4.000000
CUTCLAS2 7017 0.475987 0.499459 3340.000000 0 1.000000
SUSPEN2 7020 0.041595 0.199677 292.000000 0 1.000000
WKSENIOR 7216 8.29115910.44329559829 0 40.000000
LAW2 7019 0.021798 0.146034 153.000000 0 1.000000
_NELS-88 FEMALE COMPLETE SAMPLE                          19:58 Saturday, July 11, 1998  13
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Model: MODEL1
Dependent Variable: LOGWAGES
Analysis of Variance
                         Sum of         Mean
Source          DF      Squares       Square      F Value       Prob>F
Model 74 48.41953 0.65432 3.500 0.0001
Error 3395 634.76471 0.18697
C Total 3469 683.18424
    Root MSE       0.43240     R-square       0.0709
    Dep Mean       1.55954     Adj R-sq       0.0506
    C.V.          27.72618
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Parameter Estimates
                 Parameter      Standard    T for H0:                 Variable
Variable  DF      Estimate         Error   Parameter=0    Prob > |T|     Label
INTERCEP   1 1.434121 0.19799570 7.243 0.0001 Intercept
VOCATIO    1 0.027955 0.00765035 3.654 0.0003
SQVOCA     1 -0.005022 0.00201871 -2.487 0.0129
ACADEMI    1 -0.001420 0.00326124 -0.435 0.6633
SQACAD     1 0.000964 0.00036286 2.656 0.0079
DIFICULT   1 0.021471 0.01020754 2.103 0.0355
DUMYDIFI   1 0.062507 0.04832052 1.294 0.1959
GRADE12    1 -0.010325 0.01575294 -0.655 0.5123
TMATH      1 0.002976 0.00143256 2.077 0.0378
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TREAD      1 -0.002609 0.00128354 -2.033 0.0422
TESTBIS2   1 0.032412 0.01916750 1.691 0.0909
SCHOCATO   1 0.085092 0.03866955 2.201 0.0278
PRIVATE    1 0.059429 0.04268680 1.392 0.1639
AVA2       1 -0.077512 0.16830653 -0.461 0.6452
DUMYAVA    1 -0.013062 0.02647925 -0.493 0.6218
TEACMAD2   1 -0.001769 0.03714861 -0.048 0.9620
DUMYMADO   1 0.020340 0.02285094 0.890 0.3735
TEACWAG2   1 0.006923 0.00304836 2.271 0.0232
DUMYTEWG   1 -0.033592 0.03385392 -0.992 0.3211
HISPANIC   1 0.044164 0.02719319 1.624 0.1044
INDIAN     1 -0.043060 0.07602813 -0.566 0.5712
ASIAN      1 0.024633 0.03310821 0.744 0.4569
BLACK      1 -0.045217 0.03060743 -1.477 0.1397
DEPCHILD   1 -0.008759 0.03639546 -0.241 0.8098
MARSTAT    1 -0.016224 0.04237974 -0.383 0.7019
MALEFAM    1 0.068478 0.05918857 1.157 0.2474
FEMAFAM    1 0.011707 0.02169804 0.540 0.5895
DIVORFAM   1 -0.024994 0.02534560 -0.986 0.3241
SIBLING    1 0.003839 0.00386062 0.994 0.3201
DUMYSIBL   1 -0.022061 0.06445403 -0.342 0.7322
RELIGIO    1 0.007563 0.01719543 0.440 0.6601
HOMEWOR2   1 -0.001196 0.00139570 -0.857 0.3915
DUMYHOME   1 0.102218 0.05837837 1.751 0.0800
HOURSTV2   1 -0.005186 0.00494363 -1.049 0.2942
LIDEVARS   1 -0.049733 0.03362053 -1.479 0.1392
DUMYLIVA   1 0.044132 0.09356238 0.472 0.6372
LIDINTRA   1 0.129589 0.04528795 2.861 0.0042
DUMYLIIN   1 -0.190141 0.13409521 -1.418 0.1563
PARTCHER   1 -0.005094 0.02780452 -0.183 0.8546
DUMYCHEP   1 -0.020009 0.07161377 -0.279 0.7799
LIDECHER   1 -0.009031 0.04216839 -0.214 0.8304
LIDEACTI   1 -0.007883 0.01391240 -0.567 0.5710
PARINTRA   1 -0.066409 0.02612956 -2.542 0.0111
PARTVARS   1 0.009816 0.02482972 0.395 0.6926
PARTACTI   1 -0.008655 0.01141127 -0.758 0.4482
LIDECHUR   1 0.040173 0.04396732 0.914 0.3609
PARTCHUR   1 0.000116 0.01944210 0.006 0.9952
HANDICA    1 -0.002507 0.05372172 -0.047 0.9628
READING    1 0.001368 0.00800625 0.171 0.8643
CUTCLAS2   1 0.020619 0.01608260 1.282 0.1999
SUSPEN2    1 -0.046437 0.04447024 -1.044 0.2965
URBAN      1 0.050403 0.02339354 2.155 0.0313
SUBURBAN   1 0.059571 0.01924260 3.096 0.0020
MIDWEST    1 -0.013972 0.02479550 -0.563 0.5731
SOUTH      1 -0.037643 0.02484862 -1.515 0.1299
WEST       1 0.045828 0.02875375 1.594 0.1111
SES        1 0.022041 0.01248989 1.765 0.0777
WKSENIOR   1 0.003154 0.00081015 3.893 0.0001
WKSQ       1 0.00007157 0.00007026 1.098 0.2722
The New York State Reform Strategy                                                                                                                        WP 98-27
Page 36
LAW2       1 0.096860 0.05673943 1.707 0.0879
SELFCON    1 0.013489 0.00822082 1.641 0.1009
LOCUS      1 0.007996 0.00906169 0.882 0.3776
CATHOLI2   1 -0.011227 0.02086609 -0.538 0.5906
JEWISH     1 -0.002160 0.06955493 -0.031 0.9752
RELIOTHE   1 0.001976 0.02245395 0.088 0.9299
RELINON2   1 -0.062160 0.03174410 -1.958 0.0503
RELDK      1 -0.028588 0.06015881 -0.475 0.6347
IMPMONE3   1 0.027743 0.01336599 2.076 0.0380
DUMYMON3   1 -0.567891 0.26036540 -2.181 0.0292
IMPSTEA3   1 0.002133 0.02403785 0.089 0.9293
DUMYSTE3   1 0.440849 0.25935883 1.700 0.0893
DUMYLIDE   1 0.233546 0.14154891 1.650 0.0990
DUMYLICH   1 -0.063153 0.06351940 -0.994 0.3202
FULMONTH   1 -0.006173 0.00130074 -4.745 0.0001
PARMONTH   1 0.000247 0.00220479 0.112 0.9109
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Dependent Variable: LOGWAGES
Test: VOCACA   Numerator:      2.6014  DF:    1   F value:  13.9132
               Denominator:   0.18697  DF: 3395   Prob>F:    0.0002
Dependent Variable: LOGWAGES
Test: MPLUSR   Numerator:      0.0127  DF:    1   F value:   0.0681
               Denominator:   0.18697  DF: 3395   Prob>F:    0.7941
Dependent Variable: LOGWAGES
Test: TPLUSGDS Numerator:      0.0790  DF:    1   F value:   0.4225
               Denominator:   0.18697  DF: 3395   Prob>F:    0.5158
Dependent Variable: LOGWAGES
Test: TPGDSDIF Numerator:      0.0886  DF:    1   F value:   0.4741
               Denominator:   0.18697  DF: 3395   Prob>F:    0.4912
Dependent Variable: LOGWAGES
Test: TEACHP   Numerator:      0.5549  DF:    1   F value:   2.9681
               Denominator:   0.18697  DF: 3395   Prob>F:    0.0850
Dependent Variable: LOGWAGES
Test: MRTEST   Numerator:      1.0756  DF:    1   F value:   5.7525
               Denominator:   0.18697  DF: 3395   Prob>F:    0.0165
Dependent Variable: LOGWAGES
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Test: TVREAD   Numerator:      0.0829  DF:    1   F value:   0.4436
               Denominator:   0.18697  DF: 3395   Prob>F:    0.5054
Dependent Variable: LOGWAGES
Test: LWSUSP   Numerator:      0.0342  DF:    1   F value:   0.1829
               Denominator:   0.18697  DF: 3395   Prob>F:    0.6689
Dependent Variable: LOGWAGES
Test: ALLPROB  Numerator:      0.2438  DF:    1   F value:   1.3038
               Denominator:   0.18697  DF: 3395   Prob>F:    0.2536
Dependent Variable: LOGWAGES
Test: RELIGIO  Numerator:      0.2244  DF:    1   F value:   1.2003
               Denominator:   0.18697  DF: 3395   Prob>F:    0.2733
Dependent Variable: LOGWAGES
Test: SPORTLID Numerator:      0.6315  DF:    1   F value:   3.3773
               Denominator:   0.18697  DF: 3395   Prob>F:    0.0662
Dependent Variable: LOGWAGES
Test: SPORTPAR Numerator:      0.9644  DF:    1   F value:   5.1583
               Denominator:   0.18697  DF: 3395   Prob>F:    0.0232
Dependent Variable: LOGWAGES
Test: LIDPART1 Numerator:      1.2364  DF:    1   F value:   6.6127
               Denominator:   0.18697  DF: 3395   Prob>F:    0.0102
Dependent Variable: LOGWAGES
Test: LIDPART2 Numerator:      1.2187  DF:    1   F value:   6.5183
               Denominator:   0.18697  DF: 3395   Prob>F:    0.0107
Regression—Specification of the Tests of Restrictions
proc reg;
model logwages= vocatio sqvoca academi sqacad dificult dumydifi  grade12 tmath tread
testbis2 schocato private
ava2 dumyava teacmad2 dumymado teacwag2 dumytewg hispanic  indian asian black
depchild marstat  malefam femafam divorfam sibling dumysibl religio
homewor2 dumyhome  hourstv2    lidevars dumyliva lidintra dumyliin     lideacti   parintra
partvars      partacti    lidechur partchur handica  reading cutclas2 suspen2  urban suburban
midwest south west ses
wksenior wksq law2  selfcon locus catholi2 jewish reliothe relinon2 reldk
impmone3 dumymon3 impstea3 dumyste3   dumylide         dumylich    fulmonth parmonth;
vocaca: test vocatio=academi;
mplusr: test tmath+tread;
tplusgds: test 10*(tmath+tread)+0.84*grade12;
tpgdsdif: test 10*(tmath+tread)+0.84*grade12+0.889*dificult;
teachp: test 0.214*teacmad2+2.78*teacwag2;
mrtest: test tmath=tread;
tvread: test 1.74*hourstv2 +reading;-
lwsusp: test 0.285*law2 +0.306*suspen2 ;
allprob: test 0.285*law2 +0.306*suspen2 +0.498*cutclas2;
religio: test religio+partchur+lidechur;
sportlid: test lidevars+lidintra; sportpar: test partvars+parintra;
lidpart1: test lidevars+parintra; lidpart2: test lidintra+partvars; run;
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Definition of the Minimum Competency Test variable in NELS-88
if f2c42=. Then gradtes1=.;
else if f2c42=8 then gradtes1=.;
else if f2c42=1 then gradtes1=1;/*has to pass a test:senior*/
else gradtes1=0;
if f1c65=. Then gradtes2=.;
else if f1c65=8 then gradtes2=.;
else if f1c65=1 then gradtes2=1;/*has to past a test:sophormore*/ else gradtes2=0;
if gradtes1 ne . then gradtest=gradtes1;
else if gradtes1=. And gradtes2 ne . then gradtest=gradtes2;
else gradtest=.;
testbis2= mean(gradtes1,gradtes2);
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High School and Beyond logwage1986—Females
_HSB FEMALES   WAGES 82-85                                                    12:33 Thursday, July 23,
1998  98
Model: MODEL1
Dependent Variable: LWA86
Analysis of Variance
                         Sum of         Mean
Source          DF      Squares       Square      F Value       Prob>F
Model           91     83.00572      0.91215        7.596       0.0001
Error         3400    408.30833      0.12009
C Total       3491    491.31405
    Root MSE       0.34654     R-square       0.1689
    Dep Mean       1.76385     Adj R-sq       0.1467
    C.V.          19.64686
_HSB FEMALES   WAGES 82-85                                                    12:33 Thursday, July 23,
1998  99
Parameter Estimates
                 Parameter      Standard    T for H0:
Variable  DF      Estimate         Error   Parameter=0    Prob > |T|
INTERCEP   1      1.216483    0.15127815         8.041        0.0001
VOCATIO    1      0.009130    0.00426584         2.140        0.0324
SQVOCA     1     -0.001357    0.00116566        -1.164        0.2446
ACADEMI    1      0.003554    0.00238491         1.490        0.1363
SQACAD     1     -0.000145    0.00045881        -0.315        0.7526
DIFICULT   1      0.021491    0.00592582         3.627        0.0003
GRADES     1      0.034690    0.01208208         2.871        0.0041
TESTMATH   1      0.002775    0.00092276         3.007        0.0027
TVOCREAD   1      0.000525    0.00099523         0.528        0.5975
TESTREQ2   1      0.033967    0.01384202         2.454        0.0142
SCHOCATO   1      0.135272    0.02711045         4.990        0.0001
PRIVATE    1      0.009247    0.04410892         0.210        0.8340
AVA2       1      0.024567    0.13004427         0.189        0.8502
DUMYAVA    1     -0.042667    0.02938109        -1.452        0.1465
TEACMAD2   1      0.069925    0.02893929         2.416        0.0157
DUMYMADO   1      0.020801    0.04022360         0.517        0.6051
TEACWAG2   1      0.015414    0.00561899         2.743        0.0061
DUMYTEWG   1      0.024634    0.03051399         0.807        0.4196
PROBSTU2   1      0.003315    0.00921783         0.360        0.7191
HISPANIC   1      0.002088    0.01818939         0.115        0.9086
INDIAN     1     -0.003585    0.04934779        -0.073        0.9421
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ASIAN      1      0.054843    0.03798002         1.444        0.1488
BLACK      1     -0.024656    0.01968325        -1.253        0.2104
DEPCHILD   1     -0.072430    0.02984542        -2.427        0.0153
MARSTAT    1     -0.002605    0.03135618        -0.083        0.9338
MALEFAM    1     -0.017651    0.03982566        -0.443        0.6577
FEMAFAM2   1     -0.005099    0.01669452        -0.305        0.7601
DIVORFAM   1      0.004997    0.02162354         0.231        0.8173
SIBLING2   1     -0.005296    0.00293475        -1.805        0.0712
DUMYSIBL   1     -0.121716    0.05091056        -2.391        0.0169
RELIGIO2   1     -0.006494    0.01135863        -0.572        0.5675
HOMEWOR2   1   0.000057793    0.00166931         0.035        0.9724
HOURSTV2   1     -0.011924    0.00321645        -3.707        0.0002
DUMYPACH   1      0.016456    0.08673633         0.190        0.8495
LIDERACT   1      0.018797    0.01061373         1.771        0.0766
PARTACTI   1      0.008795    0.00573543         1.533        0.1253
LIDERSP1   1      0.026428    0.02645413         0.999        0.3179
LIDERSP2   1      0.078002    0.02896116         2.693        0.0071
LIDERCHE   1     -0.007144    0.02640054        -0.271        0.7867
PARTSPOR   1     -0.011693    0.01794858        -0.651        0.5148
PARTSPO2   1      0.007272    0.01490442         0.488        0.6257
PARTCHER   1      0.013177    0.01626212         0.810        0.4178
LIDERCHU   1     -0.036589    0.01971946        -1.855        0.0636
PARTCHUR   1      0.001928    0.01427010         0.135        0.8925
HANDICA2   1      0.013821    0.02408371         0.574        0.5661
READING    1     -0.017299    0.00561769        -3.079        0.0021
CUT2       1      0.004862    0.01345088         0.361        0.7178
SUSPEN2    1      0.021218    0.02338156         0.907        0.3642
POORSTU2   1      0.005582    0.00989503         0.564        0.5727
DUMYPOST   1     -0.108849    0.07050453        -1.544        0.1227
URBAN      1      0.076461    0.01896416         4.032        0.0001
SUBURBAN   1      0.081947    0.01584919         5.170        0.0001
CENTRAL    1     -0.080029    0.02001468        -3.999        0.0001
SOUTH      1     -0.084636    0.01940782        -4.361        0.0001
WEST       1     -0.002019    0.02224427        -0.091        0.9277
DUMYDIFI   1      0.018637    0.05433037         0.343        0.7316
DUMYACAD   1     -0.080319    0.27424340        -0.293        0.7696
DUMYVOCA   1      0.130268    0.11972714         1.088        0.2767
WKSENIO2   1      0.002195    0.00062696         3.502        0.0005
WKSQ       1  -0.000026848    0.00004459        -0.602        0.5471
LAW        1      0.004133    0.06841753         0.060        0.9518
SELFCON2   1      0.015794    0.00621902         2.540        0.0111
DUMYSELF   1      0.348759    0.35316892         0.988        0.3235
LOCUS2     1      0.023932    0.00735721         3.253        0.0012
DUMYLOCU   1     -0.361576    0.35171141        -1.028        0.3040
RELICATO   1      0.011421    0.01517427         0.753        0.4517
JEWISH     1      0.023003    0.05370956         0.428        0.6685
RELIOTHE   1     -0.023376    0.03141341        -0.744        0.4568
RELINON2   1     -0.026826    0.03294345        -0.814        0.4155
RELDK2     1      0.064875    0.05624567         1.153        0.2488
IMPMONE3   1      0.028398    0.01028549         2.761        0.0058
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DUMYIMP3   1      0.102970    0.10234692         1.006        0.3144
IMPSTEA3   1      0.009613    0.01458295         0.659        0.5098
DUMYRELI   1      0.017556    0.05947130         0.295        0.7679
DUMYPAS1   1     -0.088221    0.09765142        -0.903        0.3664
DUMYLIDE   1      0.224249    0.36488325         0.615        0.5389
DUMYLIS2   1     -0.088237    0.07730067        -1.141        0.2538
FULMO      1     -0.000377    0.00141857        -0.266        0.7906
PARMO      1      0.004183    0.00241690         1.731        0.0836
FULFE82    1      0.011474    0.02061433         0.557        0.5778
FULOC82    1     -0.004596    0.03459039        -0.133        0.8943
PARTFE82   1     -0.000500    0.02930117        -0.017        0.9864
PARTOC82   1      0.011950    0.04176987         0.286        0.7748
FULFE83    1      0.059496    0.03769142         1.578        0.1145
FULOC83    1     -0.021567    0.03744600        -0.576        0.5647
PARTFE83   1      0.041064    0.04469761         0.919        0.3583
PARTOC83   1     -0.038626    0.03724188        -1.037        0.2997
FULFE84    1     -0.020031    0.03514310        -0.570        0.5687
FULOC84    1     -0.048052    0.01878095        -2.559        0.0106
PARTFE84   1      0.007386    0.03831905         0.193        0.8472
PARTOC84   1      0.006416    0.02220466         0.289        0.7726
COLLEG85   1     -0.052373    0.01513335        -3.461        0.0005
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Dependent Variable: LWA86
Test: VOCACA   Numerator:      0.1772  DF:    1   F value:   1.4752
               Denominator:  0.120091  DF: 3400   Prob>F:    0.2246
Dependent Variable: LWA86
Test: MPLUSR   Numerator:      1.1195  DF:    1   F value:   9.3224
               Denominator:  0.120091  DF: 3400   Prob>F:    0.0023
Dependent Variable: LWA86
Test: TPLUSGDS Numerator:      1.3812  DF:    1   F value:  11.5012
               Denominator:  0.120091  DF: 3400   Prob>F:    0.0007
Dependent Variable: LWA86
Test: TPGDSDIF Numerator:      1.6891  DF:    1   F value:  14.0656
               Denominator:  0.120091  DF: 3400   Prob>F:    0.0002
Dependent Variable: LWA86
Test: SCHPROP  Numerator:      0.0238  DF:    1   F value:   0.1985
               Denominator:  0.120091  DF: 3400   Prob>F:    0.6560
Dependent Variable: LWA86
Test: TEACHQ   Numerator:      1.9286  DF:    1   F value:  16.0597
               Denominator:  0.120091  DF: 3400   Prob>F:    0.0001
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Dependent Variable: LWA86
Test: MRTEST   Numerator:      0.2416  DF:    1   F value:   2.0118
               Denominator:  0.120091  DF: 3400   Prob>F:    0.1562
Dependent Variable: LWA86
Test: TVREAD   Numerator:      2.7553  DF:    1   F value:  22.9432
               Denominator:  0.120091  DF: 3400   Prob>F:    0.0001
Dependent Variable: LWA86
Test: LWSUSP   Numerator:      0.0044  DF:    1   F value:   0.0365
               Denominator:  0.120091  DF: 3400   Prob>F:    0.8485
Dependent Variable: LWA86
Test: STPBCUT  Numerator:      0.0003  DF:    1   F value:   0.0021
               Denominator:  0.120091  DF: 3400   Prob>F:    0.9635
Dependent Variable: LWA86
Test: ALLPROB  Numerator:      0.0045  DF:    1   F value:   0.0375
               Denominator:  0.120091  DF: 3400   Prob>F:    0.8464
Dependent Variable: LWA86
Test: RELIGIO  Numerator:      0.3179  DF:    1   F value:   2.6472
               Denominator:  0.120091  DF: 3400   Prob>F:    0.1038
Dependent Variable: LWA86
Test: SPORTLID Numerator:      1.0510  DF:    1   F value:   8.7521
               Denominator:  0.120091  DF: 3400   Prob>F:    0.0031
Dependent Variable: LWA86
Test: SPORTPAR Numerator:      0.0060  DF:    1   F value:   0.0499
               Denominator:  0.120091  DF: 3400   Prob>F:    0.8232
Dependent Variable: LWA86
Test: LIDPART1 Numerator:      0.0444  DF:    1   F value:   0.3698
               Denominator:  0.120091  DF: 3400   Prob>F:    0.5432
Dependent Variable: LWA86
Test: LIDPART2 Numerator:      1.0425  DF:    1   F value:   8.6812
               Denominator:  0.120091  DF: 3400   Prob>F:    0.0032
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Dependent Variable: LWA86
Test: ACTIVSUM Numerator:      1.0089  DF:    1   F value:   8.4012
               Denominator:  0.120091  DF: 3400   Prob>F:    0.0038
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ENDNOTES
                                                 
i. Surveys of college admission officers suggest they are increasing the weight they attach to
taking rigorous courses in high school and doing well in these courses.  Grades in high
school have always been the number one consideration.  Standardized test scores have
now become the second most important consideration displacing class rank.  Class rank is
becoming less important because an increasing number of high schools are refusing to
calculate class rank. (National Association of College Admission Counselors, 1993, as
reported in the October 23, 1993 Ithaca Journal).
ii The population of 17 year olds was used as the base rather than 18 year olds because the
number of 18 year olds may be inflated by in-migration of college students and military
personnel.
iii These controls for school characteristics and region may not be sufficient to avoid omitted
variable bias.  States and school districts with such exams may be different along
unmeasured dimensions that have direct effects on wage levels.  A positive selection bias
is unlikely, however, because most states appear to have adopted MCEs as a response to
a perception that the state’s schools were failing to teach basic skills.  By 1992 MCEs had
been adopted by every southern state except Arkansas and Louisiana.  With the exception
of Arizona, none of the Mountain, Plains or Midwestern states had established a MCE prior
to 1992 (NCES 1993, p. 149).
iv The stakes for teachers and school administrators are higher because information on
numbers of students taking and passing each exam are published in local newspapers and
on the internet.  While student stakes are low compared to European and Asian curriculum-
based examination systems, they appear to be sufficient to substantially improve
achievement of New York students.  When the socio-economic characteristics of students
are controlled, New York State students out perform comparable students in other states by
about one grade level equivalent (Bishop, Moriarty and Mane 1997).
 v   This recommendation was intended to induce school districts to consider ending social
promotion at transitions between elementary and middle school and between middle and
high school.  It leaves the decision in the hands of local school boards, teachers and
administrators. State mandates on grade promotion specifying specific competencies that
must be achieved are not feasible or desirable. The committee felt that the best way of
responding to the needs of struggling students was to provide extra instruction during the
school year and during the summer.  The threat of retention in grade is, currently, often
used to induce students to attend summer school or after-school programs.   Since
students naturally want to move up to the next grade with their friends, the possibility of
being retained (particularly at transitions between buildings) is a powerful incentive to
study.  But, it should be actually employed only as a last resort. Grade retention rates are
quite high in 9th grade in New York State.  It might make more sense to make graduation
from middle school more contingent on student achievement in order to induce middle
school students to work harder and their teachers to set higher standards.
 
